Horcrux: A Password Manager for Paranoids by Li, Hannah & Evans, David
Horcrux: A Password Manager for Paranoids
Hannah Li, David Evans
University of Virginia
[hannahli,evans]@virginia.edu
ABSTRACT
Vulnerabilities in password managers are unremitting because cur-
rent designs provide large attack surfaces, both at the client and
server. We describe and evaluate Horcrux, a password manager
that is designed holistically to minimize and decentralize trust,
while retaining the usability of a traditional password manager.
The prototype Horcrux client, implemented as a Firefox add-on, is
split into two components, with code that has access to the user’s
master’s password and any key material isolated into a small au-
ditable component, separate from the complexity of managing the
user interface. Instead of exposing actual credentials to the DOM,
a dummy username and password are autofilled by the untrusted
component. The trusted component intercepts and modifies POST
requests before they are encrypted and sent over the network. To
avoid trusting a centralized store, stored credentials are secret-
shared over multiple servers. To provide domain and username
privacy, while maintaining resilience to off-line attacks on a com-
promised password store, we incorporate cuckoo hashing in a way
that ensures an attacker cannot determine if a guessed master pass-
word is correct. Our approach only works for websites that do not
manipulate entered credentials in the browser client, so we con-
ducted a large-scale experiment that found the technique appears
to be compatible with over 98% of tested login forms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Users are frequently beseeched to come up with unique, strong
passwords for every on-line account, but remembering more than
a few high-entropy passwords is well beyond the capabilities of
normal humans. Das reported that 43–51% of Internet users reuse
the same password across multiple sites [12]. According to a re-
cent survey of security experts, using a password manager was
among the most widely-accepted recommendations for improving
security [24].
Current password managers, however, do not provide adequate
protection for paranoid users. Vulnerabilities are frequently dis-
covered in both the client and server components, as revealed in
several recent reports of compromises to major commercial pass-
wordmanagers [23, 27, 47, 48]. Passwordmanagers which store user
credentials in cloud databases have been susceptible to theft and
successful dictionary attacks on stolen encrypted data, according to
recent news reports on LastPass [49] and KeePass [23]. Password
manager critics often cite database theft as a compelling reason not
to use password managers: “when password managers fail, they
offer a one-stop destination for hackers to obtain all of a target’s
passwords” [23].
Contributions. We present the comprehensive design and eval-
uation of a password manager, Horcrux,1, that provides a level
of security and privacy well beyond what is achieved by current
systems. Horcrux is designed to minimize exposure of secrets to a
small, auditable component. Although our design is intended for
direct integration into a browser (see Section 7), we have demon-
strated and evaluated its effectiveness by implementing a prototype
as an open source Firefox add-on (Section 5).
Our server side design (Section 3.2) distributes trust by using
secret sharing to store passwords across multiple hosts, and makes
novel use of cuckoo hashing to provide user and domain privacy
without enabling off-line attacks on password stores. Our client
design isolates the component that has access to passwords from
the rest of the password manager. Horcrux never exposes the cre-
dentials to the DOM, minimizing exposure of user credentials by
replacing autofilled dummy credentials with real credentials in out-
going network traffic (Section 3.3). Ideas similar to the password
swapping in intercepted outgoing network traffic we use have been
proposed before [46], but not adopted by password managers due
to usability and compatibility concerns. To evaluate the deployabil-
ity of our design, we conducted a large-scale study of Alexa’s top
million websites. As reported in Section 6, we find that Horcrux
appears to be compatible with 98% of the websites where a login
form was found.
Security researchers have long advocated for minimizing trusted
computing bases [13, 30, 42] and using privilege separation [8,
41], and secret-sharing is a well established technique [43]. The
main contribution of this work is combining established techniques
and our privacy-preserving credential storing scheme in a holistic
way to solve an important security problem, and performing a
comprehensive evaluation of both the security and compatibility
of that design.
2 CONTEXT
This section provides background on vulnerabilities in current pass-
wordmanager designs and implementations, and presents the threat
model that drives our design decisions.
2.1 Password Manager Vulnerabilities
We divide password manager vulnerabilities into client-side vul-
nerabilities, where the adversary is able to compromise the client
1A “Horcrux” is a dark, magical object in the Harry Potter book series in which a
witch or wizard may hide a fragment of their soul. The antagonist of the series,
Voldemort, uses multiple horcruxes to distribute the trust of his soul into multiple
objects. Voldemort cannot die as long as at least one of his horcruxes is alive.
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or its network connection, and server-side vulnerabilities, where
the adversary compromises the password store.
Client Vulnerabilities. Major password managers autofill user
credentials into authentication forms found on visited webpages.
This exposes those credentials to the DOM, where they are visible
to injected malicious scripts [29, 45, 46] that can read the form
using Element.value. This returns the string currently present in
an input field, even if it is a password type field that displays as
asterisks. Any value filled in by the password manager or typed
in by the user can be stolen by the script. The dynamic nature of
JavaScript means functions used in the password manager code may
be replaced by adversaries. Li et al. found that all three of the tested
password managers that supported bookmarklets were vulnerable
to these kinds of vulnerabilities [29]. Silver et al. examined the
autofill policies of 15 password managers and found that all had
followed some unsafe practices with the security of their autofill
policies [45]. None of the password managers comprehensively
checked whether the protocol and action of the login form are
secure before autofilling the credentials, making the credentials
susceptible to being sent to a different destination or through an
insecure protocol (HTTP). This risk may be exacerbated by autofill
policies that autofill without any user interaction required, allowing
attackers to obtain credentials from a large number of domains
through an access point.
Password manager clients are also vulnerable because of imple-
mentation bugs, particularly in complex URL parsing code. In 2016,
Karlsson [26] detected a bug in the Lastpass client script code that
treated the wrong part of the URL as the domain, which allowed
an attacker to fool the LastPass browser extension into providing a
user’s credentials for any stored domain. This motivates our design
to separate the complex UI code from the small trusted core.
Server Vulnerabilities. Password managers can store credentials
either in the cloud or locally on the user’s computer. Using local
storage eliminates the need to trust an external provider, but means
that it is now up to the user (who lacks the physical and technical
resources of a cloud provider with a data center) to protect the
store, and that there is no way to share credentials across multiple
devices. It also means that an attacker who can compromise the
user’s device would now have access to both the password client
and store. Although our design allows for the storage devices to
include a mix of user-hosted or local stores, for nearly all users, we
expect it is a better option to outsource storage to cloud providers.
Users who store their credentials in the cloud or user-hosted
platforms inherit the risk of server-side compromises. Unlike a
locally stored password database, an adversary could mount an at-
tack on such servers from anywhere and attempt to steal their data,
as happened to LastPass in 2015 [22] and OneLogin in 2017 [44].
These thefts typically expose encrypted versions of users passwords,
URLs, and emails for all of their online accounts, which are open to
thieves to attempt to decrypt offline. Notably, the LastPass server
compromise included leakage of a cryptographic hash of many
users masters passwords, which was used to decrypt their sensitive
online account login information. Modern password managers seek
to mitigate offline attacks by storing encrypted passwords using
intentionally slow key derivation functions that amplify the cost of
a dictionary attack. Currently, in 2017, it is much more common for
password managers to never store the user’s master password on
any device, and instead rely on the key derivations from the user’s
master password and other local secrets to decrypt passwords on
the servers.
2.2 Threat Model
Our focus is on mitigating the risks posed by motivated and capable
adversaries who can inject scripts into web pages, compromise the
client’s network access, and may be able to compromise a server
database to acquire a full copy of its contents.
Client Side.We assume the adversary can inject scripts into any
visited webpage, including pages delivered using HTTPS, but can-
not access the server-side code to create vulnerabilities on page.
This covers the possibility of script injection vulnerabilities in the
trusted website, as well as wireless access point attacks, both of
which we consider realistic threats.
We distinguish two levels of XSS attackers: a standard attacker
who only has the ability to inject scripts into the page with no
knowledge of any other vulnerabilities on the server, and a stronger
attacker who has specific knowledge of vulnerable pages hosted on
the host server and thus can carry out reflect-aided XSS attacks. The
severity of these reflect-aided attacks depends on the vulnerabilities
on the page—from a vulnerable login target page, to one that reflects
all parameters or certain parameters. The compromised page on
the site would then resend the submitted password to another site
owned by the attacker, or back to the compromised client where
they would now be vulnerable to the attacker’s scripts. For now,
we consider stronger client-side attackers with knowledge about
server-side vulnerabilities out of scope; although some strategies
may mitigate certain types of these attacks (for example, restricting
the specific target pages to the original target and limiting the
names of fields containing password), an attacker with access to
both a XSS vulnerability and knowledge of a vulnerable server page
has many ways to victimize the user.
In other client-side attacks, an adversary who can compromise
the client’s browser to access its internal state (for example, by
exploiting a memory corruption vulnerability in the browser to
executed arbitrary code with a ROP attack) can extract secrets from
anywhere in the browser’s memory, and can generate authentic-
looking dialog boxes to request the master password from the user.
Similarly, an attacker with a root-level compromise of the client’s
system, can install a keylogger or alter the clients certificate store to
spoof HTTPS connections to targeted sites. No password manager
design can provide strong defenses to compromises at those levels.
Hence, we consider the web browser and host operating system to
be a trusted computing base.
We do not consider social engineering or interface spoofing at-
tacks where victims would be tricked into entering their master
password into a rogue dialog box or directly providing their un-
encrypted credentials to an adversary’s site. The lack of trusted
input paths in commonly-used computing systems is an important
problem and serious threat, but outside the scope of this work. As
discussed further in Section 4.1, our prototype implementation also
assumes the user will not be tricked into installing a malicious add-
on that can observe network traffic after the password manager
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add-on has inserted the real password (this is necessary for our
prototype because of limitations in Firefox’s extension mechanism,
but would not be an issue for a password manager built into a
browser or mobile OS).
Server Side. For the server side, we include the threat of full release
of all data stored by a cloud server. This could happen as the result
of a server vulnerability [19], insider attack from a cloud service em-
ployee, or the cloud service complying with a subpoena or national
security letter. Hence, it is important that the data stored by the
cloud servers is not vulnerable to an offline guessing attack on the
master password. This leads to a design objective that everything
encrypted with keys derived from the master password must be
indistinguishable to an attacker so there is no way to determine if
a guess is correct.
Finally, we assume the user should not have any intrinsic trust
in the provider of the password manager. This means we want a
design where the code that has access to sensitive data is as small
and simple as possible, to make individual or third-party auditing
realistic.
3 DESIGN
Our prototype password manager, Horcrux, is implemented as an
open-source Firefox add-on [32]. (As discussed in Section 4.1, this
is a temporary approach to support our experimentation, and it is
not possible to provide sufficient security with the current exten-
sion mechanisms.) The repository is available at https://github.com/
HainaLi/horcrux_password_manager (full data from our experiments
are too large to host there, but is available to interested researchers
on request).
3.1 Requirements
The driving motivation for our design is to provide strong security
against both client and server vulnerabilities, while providing us-
ability that is similar to current password managers. In particular,
our design aims to:
• Minimize exposure of user credentials in both time and the
amount of code they are visible to.
• Limit the size of the trusted component on the server to a
small, auditable core.
• Provide resistance against server compromises by ensuring
that even a full compromise of a single password store
does not enable at attacker to conduct offline attacks on
the user’s master password.
• Provide functionality and usability similar to current pass-
word managers, including supporting single click logins
for sites with stored credentials.
Next, we describe how the password stores are implemented. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the client.
3.2 Password Stores
For server-side storage of domain credentials, our goal is to ensure
that an attacker who obtains a full copy of a single server’s store
cannot execute a successful attack to learn the user’s credentials,
or even the domains where the user has stored passwords. Thus,
we need to store credentials at the server in a way that an off-line
guessing attack is not possible. There are a small set of domains
that a user is likely to have credentials for, and an attacker can
probably guess domains like facebook.com and gmail.com that will
be used by most users. Hence, it is essential that the passwords are
stored in a way that does not enable an attacker with access to the
store to determine if a guessed master password is correct.
Designing loss-resistant password vaults with such goals in mind
has been studied notably by Bojinov et al. [10], who fabricated de-
coy password sets and by Juels and Ristenpart [25], who introduced
the concept of honey encryption to yield plausible-looking but
bogus plaintexts for every guess of the encryption key. These de-
signs, however, have been constructed with specific data patterns
(i.e. passwords or RSA keys) in mind, and are susceptible to at-
tacks exploiting the differences in the generated distribution of
passwords, which is a problem with all static Natural Language
Encoders (NLE) [21].
In our case, a better solution is to take advantage of secret sharing
since this means all of the actual entries are indistinguishable from
randomness. All we need to hide is the locations of actual entries.
Our solution is to adopt cuckoo hashing [40]. Although cuckoo
hashing was not originally designed to support privacy, it can be
adapted to meet our goals and provides a solution that is cost-
effective for both storage and bandwidth.
In the original cuckoo hashing, a given data point, xi , gets two
possible positions, h1(xi ) inT1 and h2(xi ) inT2. The hash functions,
h1 and h2, are assumed to behave like independent and random
oracles for the possible keys in the table. During an insert operation,
one empty position is chosen at random to store xi . If both positions
are occupied, it follows the cuckoo bird’s approach of replacing the
current resident with the new resident and repeating and bouncing
between the two tables until an empty position is found or when
the maximum number of iterations is reached. Pagh and Rodler set
this maximum number atC log t , whereC is a constant and t is the
number of data points. At this point, the entire table is rehashed by
choosing a different h1 and h2. Multiple rehashing attempts may be
necessary before all the data points find a spot. Successful cuckoo
hashing achieves worst case constant lookup and deletion time and
amortized constant time for insertions.
In our server design, we use a variant of cuckoo hashing that
puts all data in a single table of size p, instead of using multiple
independent tables. We use n independent hash functions capable
of mapping xi uniformly and randomly into any of the p locations
in the table. (Discussion on how parameters are selected is deferred
to the end of this subsection.) For each entry, with cuckoo hashing
the table can store at any one of (up to) n possible locations:
h1(d, e) = H (str(1) | | e | | H (d)) mod p
...
hn (d, e) = H (str(n) | | e | | H (d)) mod p
(1)
where d is the domain, e = PBKDF2(master_password) is the en-
cryption key, p is the table size, and H is a cryptographic hash
function (our implementation uses SHA-256).
Account Entries. For each account, we store a value in JSON
format containing shares of the id tag, username, username length,
username tag, password, password length, password tag, and IV.
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The tags and IV are for AES-GCM encryption and decryption of
the username and password. (The IV is incremented by 10 when
encrypting and decrypting the password.) The data stored in the
keystores are not the encrypted plaintext credentials, but a secret
share for each of the s keystores, so no information is disclosed in
these values. These are padded to a fixed length prior to encryption
so no information is disclosed. The username and password fields
are padded up to a maximum length (our prototype uses a default
maximum of 64 characters), and the length parameters indicate
the real length of the credentials. The id tag is just the hash of the
domain, id_taд = H (d), with SHA-256 this is a 256-bit output. An
id tag indicating an empty table key location is 256 bits of zeros.
Initial Table Setup. The first time the keystores are used, we
prepopulate the all the tables with p table key-value pairs that are
meant to mask the rows holding real accounts after Horcrux is used.
The pre-secret shared values for all the table values are hexadecimal
strings of zeros of the length prior to secret sharing. We rely on
secret sharing to produce the different shares stored in p rows of the
keystores. Using Amazon AWS DynamoDB API’s batchWriteItem
method, we could store up to 25 key-value pairs at a time. All users
will start with a table that appears to be full of account entries, and
there is no way to distinguish real from empty entries from a single
keystore.
Item Lookup. To lookup a domain’s account information, we sim-
ply calculate the table keys associated with the domain using Equa-
tion 1 and obtainn table keys. Next, we query each of the s keystores
and obtain n values, vs,n , from each keystore. After combining the
shares, we acquire n values for each of the entries in the table (Note
that only the username and passwords were encrypted and the rest
do not need to be decrypted):
v1 = dec(combineShares(v1,1, ...,vs,1), e, IV1, taд1)
...
vn = dec(combineShares(v1,n , e, ...,vs,n ), e, IVn , taдn )
We then compare each of the combined id tags with the hash of
the domain, picking the value containing the correct id tag.
Item Insertion. In our variant of cuckoo hashing, we have n pos-
sible places for the credentials to a domain, d . We use cuckoo hash-
ing’s collision resolution technique, as described in Section 3.2, to
find a "nest" for every credential by calculating the locations for the
booted values from its id tag. Inserting new item is the main concern
for user-perceived latency, which is discussed in Section 5. Deleting
or updating an account, is simply a matter or writing shares of the
new value (all zeros for deletion) into the stored location.
Parameters.We select the default parameters for our cuckoo hash
table for a reasonable balance of storage costs and minimal prob-
ability of collisions. Each location in the table can only hold one
item. With n = 2, the effective load factor is less than 0.5. At higher
load factors, cuckoo hashing performance drastically decreases and
frequently needs rehashing. With n ≥ 3, the load factor increases
substantially. The value c∗ is used to represent the load factor for
which the probability that all p · c∗ items can be placed in the table.
Fountoulakis and Panagiotou proved that for n = 5, c∗5 = 0.992 [16],
meaning that nearly the entire table can be filled before rehashing
is needed. For performance reasons, we are also concerned with
the expected number of collision resolutions needed. Fountoulakis
et al. analyzed the number of insertions needed for a cuckoo hash
table, and proved a polylogarithmic bound on the number needed
holds for all but negligible probability [17]. For our implementa-
tion, the key stores support batch read and right requests (up to 25
elements at a time for AWS’ DynamoDB API), so the network cost
of increasing the number of hash functions is low, and the local
computation cost is also fairly low. Hence, we select n = 5.
A 2007 study [15] on the number of accounts owned by the typi-
cal user found that the average user as 6.5 passwords, which are
shared between 3.9 different sites, and that each user has about 25
accounts.We reason that in 2017, the typical user has more accounts.
As a result, we design Horcrux to support a default maximum capac-
ity of 10,000 accounts, and use p = 10079 (the first prime number
above 10,000), and n = 5. This puts our expected maximum random-
walk insertion time at around 8 reassignments for a fully-loaded
table. Frieze et al. [18] discussed that while breadth-first search
gives constant expected time, it cannot guarantee sub-polynomial
runtime for the insertion of each element. The amortized time com-
plexities are unsuitable for applications that rely on cuckoo hashing
to guarantee fast individual insertions. Therefore, we stick to the
original cuckoo hashing random-walk insertion algorithm.
3.3 Client
The overriding designs goal of the client is to minimize exposure of
user credentials to a small, auditable component. Hence, the client
is divided into two components: a trusted core that needs access to
the master password and sensitive credentials, and an untrusted
UI component that manages interactions with the webpage but
cannot access any Firefox API. The core and UI components are
completely isolated from each other and can only communicate
through the message-passing. For all sensitive computation, The
core component creates a NodeJS subprocess which uses its crypto
library for all cryptographic algorithms[39], as well as AWS and
Azure APIs for making requests to keystores.
Next, we describe how to setup the client, and what happens
when it is used in the brower to process a login request. Figure 1
illustrates the interactions between the user, browser add-on, and
keystores.
Setup. To use Horcrux users need to set up servers that store
shares of the users passwords. Our prototype add-on prompts users
to create accounts on AWS or Azure and create access keys with
permissions to use their noSQL keystores (AWS DynamoDB or
Azure Table Storage) in a specific datacenter region. More paranoid
users will configure keystores themselves using trusted services and
spread across jurisdictions. A user may also use their own servers
as a keystore, any server that supports the appropriate keystore
APIs can be used. Each keystore in initialized as a cuckoo hash table
full with shares of empty values as described in Section 3.2.
The user is prompted to provide credentials obtained from AWS
or Azure (their accessKeyID and secretAccessKey) for each keystore,
and to create a master password. The core component derives a
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Figure 1: Horcrux protocol
keystore authentication key from the master password (MP) using
a Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF2) over 100,000
iterations, following similar practices used by 1Password [1]. The
keystore server credentials provided are encrypted using AuthKey
using AES-256 with GCM mode in base64 encoding, and stored
along with the IV, tags, and PBKDF2 salt in a config.json file on
the client’s device.2 The IV is newly generated for each encryption,
2For AWS keystores, the region in which each set of credentials is configured to use is
stored unencrypted. Storing region information is necessary in order to use the AWS
API, and encrypting the region name would present an opportunity for an adversary
to perform an offline dictionary attack on the master password. We view the risk of
leaking the keystore region to an adversary who acquires the encrypted configuration
file as much less serious than any risk of enabling an off-line attack on the master
password.
and incremented by 10 for each access key or secret. This file is
not accessible to webpages in the browser due to Firefox’s isolation
policies [34]. Although our design attempts to limit the effectiveness
of guessing attacks on the master password, it is still important that
users select a strong enough master password to resist at least on-
line guessing attacks. Access credentials are randomly generated
by AWS or Azure and their base64 encoding prevents them from
being susceptible to such dictionary attacks. On-line attacks are
limited by the cloud servers limits on incorrect login attempts.
Initialization.When a user opens Firefox and begins the browser
session, the core component checks for config.json, a file in the
add-on containing the user’s encrypted keystore credentials. If the
encrypted credentials are not present, the setup steps are performed.
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Otherwise, the core component prompts the user for their master
password. The encrypted credentials are read from config.json
and stored as strings in the core component’s private memory. The
master password is used to derive the 512-bitAuthKey using PBKDF2
over 100,000 iterations. The AuthKey is then used as the decryption
key to an AES-256 cipher, and the core component deciphers each
encrypted credential. The AuthKey is kept in the core component
memory for the duration of the session (it is kept until browser is
closed) to avoid needing to repeatedly request the master password.
Next, the core component verifies the user’s keystore credentials
by initiating a connection to each keystore. If the request fails, the
user is presumed to have given an incorrect master password, and
the core component returns to prompting for the master password.
There is no enforced limit on password attempts at the client side, as
all verification is done online and subject to AWS or Azure policies
for making many requests with incorrect credentials.
Login Form and Account Retrieval. When the browser loads
a webpage, the UI component finds login forms on the page by
searching for forms with an input type=password and uses heuris-
tics to exclude registration forms based on the form title and input
labels. Once a login form is found, then the UI component notifies
the core component with the URL of the containing page. The core
component proceeds to query to keystores to check for the presence
of an account associated with the domain, as previous described in
Section 3.2. For the protocol, we assume that each domain only has
one account associated with it. See the discussion on supporting
multiple usernames per domain in Section 7.
Although it would be simplest and most secure to wait until the
user submits the form to start the process of obtaining and recon-
structing the account credentials, we considered this unacceptable
for user experience. If we fetch the password shares after the user
clicks submit, the user would experience the delay of fetching and
reconstructing shares as well as the usual server response latency.
Further, due to the indeterministic nature of JavaScript, we cannot
guarantee that the core component would receive the "user clicked"
signal from the UI component before the login traffic leaves the
browser.
Swapping Credentials. After obtaining credentials for a login
form, the core component sends dummy credentials to the UI com-
ponent to be autofilled in the form, and starts actively listening
to network traffic. The UI component autofills the fields in with
dummy user and password strings by setting the elements’ value.
These dummy values are different for each user but the same for
every website that the user visits. Hence, the actual credentials
are never exposed to the DOM, but a user will receive visual feed-
back that stored credentials are available for the form. The idea of
avoiding exposure of passwords to injected scripts by using dummy
credentials to autofill forms and replacing them in network traffic
was previously suggested by Stock and Johns [46].
The core component waits for the user to click submit, at which
point all instances of the dummy username and password in the
request traffic are intercepted swapped for the real credentials
before TLS encryption. Before inserting the real credentials, the core
component checks that the target domain matches the credentials’
domain and that the request is secure (the target URL is HTTPS and
the dummy username and password are not used as URL parameters
in a GET request).
.
Enrolling New Accounts. If the user has not already registered
with the domain, Horcrux generates a strong password using ran-
dom bytes from NodeJS’ crypto library (users may override pass-
word generation to provide a user-generated password manually).
The generated password is prefixed with a fixed set of characters
(AaBa12#$) which satisfy the majority of web account password
creation policies.3 The credentials are then stored using cuckoo
hashing’s insert algorithm, as described in Section 3.2.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Horcrux is designed to provide strong protection of user credentials
against the realistic threat model described in Section 2.2. Here,
we analyze how well it resists both client-side (Section 4.1) and
server-side (Section 4.2) adversaries.
4.1 Client Security
Horcrux’s overriding design goals are to minimize attack surface
and decentralize trust as much as possible. To achieve this goal,
Horcrux is split into two components, a trusted component that
has access to the user’s entered master password and secrets de-
rived from it and obtained from the keystores using credentials
obtained from the master password, and an untrusted component
that manages the user interface and everything else that does not
involve any sensitive data. The main strategies to minimize the
client-side attack surface are to limit the window of opportunity
for an attacker to steal the login credentials and to make the client
code that has access to the master password as small and simple
as possible so that it may be realistically audited. The entire code
for the trusted component is around 800 non-comment lines of
JavaScript.
Password Exposure. Because the password is never inserted into
the DOM, it is not vulnerable to reading by injected scripts. Pass-
word managers that reveal the real credentials earlier in the process
are limited to checking the form action at the time of the autofill,
so could be vulnerable to scripts that dynamically modify the form
action after the password has been provided. Horcrux ensures that
the password is only ever sent to the correct domain by checking
the URL in the POST request in the intercepted network traffic. The
request must use HTTPS, so this ensures (assuming the browser
verifies HTTPS certificates and implements TLS correctly) that the
real credentials will only ever be inserted into an outgoing network
request to the intended domain.
Malicious scripts could also steal the credentials through a re-
flection attack by changing the action or field of the form or by
inserting a bogus form on the page. When the modified or malicious
form is submitted, the credentials are sent to an attacker-controlled
section of the website. The only way to prevent this type of attack
3We have not focused on password generation, and appreciate that generating pass-
words that pass some site’s password rules is a challenging (and annoying) problem,
and no single password will satisfy all rules. The problem of generating good and
permissable passwords is orthogonal to the password management issues that are our
primary research focus.
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would be through requiring the entire URL path to match the en-
rolled path (and hope that page has no reflection vulnerabilities),
not just the domain. Enforcing a specific path may break many
websites that dynamically generate their target URLs.4 In this re-
spect, Horcrux is not more vulnerable than traditional password
managers or manual input of credentials by a user. As mentioned in
Section 2.2, we consider an attacker with knowledge of an arbitrary
reflection vulnerability on the host server out of scope, and do not
know of any effective defense against such a powerful attacker.
Resisting Guessing Attacks on Master Password. An adver-
sary who compromises the client’s host may be able to obtain the
config.json file that contains keystore credentials encrypted with
a key derived from the user’s master password. This file may also
be exposed when a user moves it to setup a new device. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.3, Horcrux derives an encryption key from the
master password using a password-based key Derivation Function
(PBKDF2) over 100,000 iterations. This limits the number of guessing
attempts an adversary could make, but a sufficiently resourceful
adversary could still be able to execute an effective dictionary attack
against a weak master password. Since the user-selected master
password may be weak, it is important that there is no way for an
adversary to do an off-line dictionary attack against it. There should
be no way for the adversary to check if a guessed master password
is correct without sending a request to an external service such
as an attempt to authenticate with a keystore server. We ensure
this by being careful to never encrypt anything with keys derived
from the master password that is distinguishable from randomness
to an off-line adversary. An adversary can only verify their guess
on the master password by deriving the key, using it to decrypt
access credentials, and performing an online query with the creden-
tials. The access credentials are random bit strings, so an adversary
cannot determine if a guess on the master password is successful
without submitting those credentials to a guessed keystore server.
This is slow and expensive, and also subject to methods the key-
store server should use to limit the number of inauthentic requests
attempted (i.e., “throttling”). Neither Amazon nor Microsoft makes
these mechanisms public, but at worst, they are no more than the
limits for regular requests. AWS limits the steady-state request rates
to 1000 requests per second using the token bucket algorithm [5];
Azure limits read requests to 15,000 per hour and write requests to
1,200 per hour [31].
Security Limitations to a Firefox Add-on. Browsers add-ons
naturally limit the attack surface by isolating the higher privileged
core component from the UI component [7]. Because the UI com-
ponent runs in an insecure environment, the web pages, they are
exposed to more threats despite the fact that each script running
on the page can only access its own variables. Cross-extension
attacks [11] exploit add-ons that have not properly defined its
namespace. When a malicious add-ons is using the same JavaScript
namespace of a benign add-ons, it can access and modify all of the
benign add-on’s global variables, functions, and objects. Recently,
4One mitigation for this that may be compatible with more sites, suggested by Ben
Stock, is to verify the field names in the transmission before exposing the user’s
credentials. This would prevent reflection attacks that exploit pages such as a search
page which will only reflect content in certain parameters that do not include the
username and password fields, but not help with arbitrary reflection pages.
LastPass reported that it had updated its non-mobile browser ex-
tensions to fix this vulnerability, which allowed a clever attacker
to force the LastPass extension to reveal stored user data [28]. We
are aware of the threat that cross-extension poses to Horcrux and
avoid using global variables, functions, and objects.
As an add-on subjected to the limitations of Firefox’s API, our
prototype Horcrux implementation intercepts and changes the net-
work traffic using the same methods available to other add-ons.
Since Firefox does not have a specific resolution for conflicts be-
tween different add-ons, it is not determined which add-on will
have the last opportunity to view and edit the request. Another add-
on with traffic interception capabilities that executes after Horcrux,
would be able to read the final version of the POST request which
includes the real credentials. This is serious risk, but mitigated
by the user interactions needed to install an add-on. In February
2015, Mozilla made it more difficult for attackers to run malicious
add-ons by only allowing reviewed and signed add-ons to run on
browsers [35]. This security feature, however, could be turned off
by the user, and an insufficiently paranoid user could be tricked into
installing a malicious add-on. Section 7 discusses ways Horcrux
could be deployed.
4.2 Server Security
Horcrux is designed to avoid trusting any single keystore. Here we
consider the risks if a single keystore is compromised, and if all of
the user’s keystores are compromised.
Single Keystore Compromise. If an adversary obtains the com-
plete keystore database from one of the keystores (or several of
the keystores, up to the secret sharing threshold), they learn no
semantic information other than its size if the user’s keystore has
expanded beyond the default size. The secret-sharing mechanism
means that a single share provides no semantic information. Up to
the threshold limit number of keystores may be fully compromised
without any loss of credentials. Because of the way we use cuckoo
hashing and fill all entries of the table with shares which will appear
indistinguishable to an adversary, there is no way for an adversary
to tell with entries in the table correspond to real accounts. This
prevents a guessing attack on master password with popular do-
mains, since all possible guesses lead to an indistinguishable set of
possible locations.
Our design does not hide the access pattern, however. This means
an adversary who can observe unencrypted requests to the keystore
over time (e.g., the keystore operator itself, or an adversary that
compromises a keystore server without detection and maintains a
monitor there) would be able to learn common patterns of requests.
Such an adversary could perform a guessing attack on the master
password with common domains, to look for sets of locations that
match the requests. Hiding this access pattern would either require
giving up on domain privacy (so the domain is no longer encrypted
with the master password, but revealed in cleartext in the keystore
request), or using expensive methods such as Oblivious RAM [20]
to hide access patterns.
The secret sharing schemes we use are malleable, so an adversary
who has complete access to a user’s keystore could modify their
passwords and credentials (with XOR-secret-sharing this is simple
bit flipping; with Shamir-sharing it is more difficult to do in a
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predictable way). This could prevent users from being able to obtain
their passwords, but is not a threat to confidentiality.
Multiple Keystore Compromise. If all the user’s keystores are
fully compromised, the adversary can reconstruct the users’ en-
crypted passwords. This seems unlikely to happen from vulner-
abilities or insider threats if the user has keystores operated by
different cloud services, but may be a risk under subpoena threats
(users paranoid about NSLs or subpoenas will want to choose the
jurisdictions of their keystores accordingly). Each password is en-
crypted with the master-password derived key before sharing it; the
adversary would still need to do a dictionary attack on the master
password to obtain the user’s password.
5 PERFORMANCE
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Horcrux, focusing
on the latency that a user may experience with Horcrux’ multi-
keystore and secret sharing design.
Experiment Setup.We conduct both our microbenchmarks (tim-
ings for DynamoDB requests) and actual client latency on an EC2
c4.xlarge node in the Northern Virginia region to simulate user
experience. The c4.xlarge nodes are equipped with 4 vCPUs, 7.5
GB of memory [3, 4]. For the microbenchmark tests in Table 1,
we send individual read and write requests to keystores located in
Northern Virginia, Oregon, Ireland, and Singapore. This models a
user paranoid enough to want four keystores spread across multi-
ple jurisdictions to resist state-level attacks. In reality, a paranoid
user would also want to use different service providers to host the
keystores, but for simplicity of our experiments we use AWS for all
of them. Since the main issue is latency to the keystores, it should
not have a significant impact on the results if the keystores were
hosted by different providers, so long as they provide a similar
batch request API as the one we use. Both the store and write exper-
iments are taken sending an individual item to the keystores. For
the amount of data that we send, a batch request of up to 25 items
(the maximum allowed by DynamoDB) does not take noticably
longer than an individual item request.
For the user experience tests (Table 2), we report the latency
a user would experience when trying to retrieve credentials and
enroll a new account. For credentials retrieval, the timer starts when
a form is detected and ends when the password is reconstructed
and Horcrux is listening for the submit click. This doesn’t include
the time required to detect the form, but that time mostly depends
on the page load time which depends on the individual host. If
the credentials are ready by the time the user clicks submit, then
Horcrux will have little impact on end users. If not, the submit
request would be delayed until the credentials are ready, and the
delay may be noticable and annoying to users.
For enrolling an account, the timer starts when the user indicates
that she wants to store account information and ends when the
server responds with “write successful”. This corresponds to the
point when the credentials would be submitted to the account’s host
server. Cuckoo hashing inserts can sometimes take multiple read
and write round trips to the keystores to find a placement. Here,
we assume that each store succeeds on the first try. As discussed in
Virginia Oregon Ireland Singapore
Write (ms) 64.3 (5.03) 409 (21.3) 361 (25.1) 973 (45.2)
Read (ms) 65.0 (5.16) 309 (23.7) 356 (20.2) 927 (37.0)
Table 1: Time in milliseconds for a write or read request
from a node in US East (Northern Virginia). Results are av-
erages over 10 requests, standard deviations in parentheses.
US (3) World (4)
Retrieve Credentials (s) 0.80 (0.034) 1.59 (0.49)
Enroll Account (s) 1.16 (0.04) 2.49 (0.17)
Table 2: Time in seconds that an user would experience. The
US column is for a user with three keystores, 2 in Northern Virginia
and 1 in Oregon, The World column is for the 4 keystores listed in
Table 1). Results are averages over 10 requests, standard deviations
in parentheses.
Section 3.2, the system parameters are set so it should be very rare
for multiple attempts to be needed.
Results. Table 1 presents the results from our microbenchmark
latency tests. The duration for each read and write requests depends
largely on the distance they are from the client. Since the password
cannot be reconstructed until all shares are received (using a para-
noid configuration where the secret-sharing threshold is set to the
number of shares), the latency experienced by the user will depend
on the latency to the furthest keystore.
Table 2 shows the average time in seconds that it takes for Hor-
crux to retrieve credential for a user with keystores on US coasts
and one with globally-distributed keystores in the locations in
Table 1. In addition to the retrieval layency, there is significant
overhead caused by the Firefox extension and cryptographic com-
putations. Enrolling account information takes almost twice as long
as fetching an account. This makes sense because in cuckoo hash-
ing, storing into the table requires two roundtrips to the server. A
paranoid user who stores shares of his credentials around the world
would have to wait approximately 1.6 seconds after the page loads
be able to login. To register a new account with Horcrux, the user
needs to wait 2.5 or more seconds, depending on how many spots
need to be evicted.
We have not done any user testing yet to know how acceptable
these results are (that is, how often does a user click submit to login
within the credentials reconstruction time, and how noticeable
and annoying is the additional delay when the client has to wait
for credentials to be ready). Although we suspect these times are
long enough to be noticeable for most users, we note that with the
right UI display paranoid users may be willing to wait a second
or two to perform a login, and there are many opportunities to
improve performance to approach the keystore latencies in Table 1,
especially for a deployment that is integrated into a browser rather
than running as an add-on as our prototype.
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6 COMPATIBILITY TESTING
For the credential swapping method to work correctly, the dummy
credentials must be visible in the outgoing request traffic. Client
scripts could alter the values entered for the username and password
in ways that would disrupt recognition. In this section, we describe
the SwapScan tool we built to perform compatibility testing (Sec-
tion 6.1), reports on how we tested Alexa’s top million websites
(Section 6.2), and present our compatibility results (Section 6.3).
SwapScan uses heuristics to find login forms on web sites, and
then automates the login process using the dummy username and
password. For sites where a test login can be performed, SwapScan
checks the request traffic for the dummy username and password
strings. We found this test to be successful on 98% of the tested
logins, which gives us a high confidence that Horcrux would work
on a majority of the web. As a by-product of our compatibility test,
we also found many insecure login form development practices,
which are not directly relevant to password managers; we report
on these findings in Section 6.4.
6.1 SwapScan
SwapScan, our login automation tool, is built on top of OpenWPM,
a fully-automated, open-source framework for large-scale web scan-
ning [14]. OpenWMP provides scalability by wrapping Selenium
instances in a driver that monitors their activity, ensuring that if
the web page stalls or if one Selenium crashes, the test would con-
tinue. OpenWPM, which was originally intended to measure web
privacy from third-party scripts, also includes a proxy and a series
of hooks for data collection — two features that were essential for
our experiments.
SwapScan starts by using OpenWPM to visit a URL from a list
of URLs of the front page of websites, and then uses heuristics to
scan the site to attempt to find, fill in, and submit a login form. Our
approach is adapted from SSOScan [50], but is more complicated
since we are looking for login forms instead of SSO buttons.
Finding Login Forms. After visiting the URL, SwapScan attempts
to find a login form on the website. The strongest indicator of a
potential authentication form is the presence of a HTML element
with type=password in the form children. Once an authentication
form is found, SwapScan determines whether the current form is
for login or registration. If there are two password children in the
form, then the form is likely a registration form. Other indicators
used to separate registration forms from logins include keywords in
the title of the page, keywords in the form attributes, and whether
the form contains an input with registration topics (e.g., birthdate,
security question). SwapScan determines the topic of an input box
by matching regexes with element attribute values. If the candidate
form is not a login, SwapScan will try other forms on the page.
If no suitable form is found on the current page, SwapScan uses
heuristics to click on buttons likely to reveal forms until it either
finds one or reaches the maximum number of attempts allowed.
Candidate buttons are identified on the page and ranked by match-
ing regular expressions such as [Ll ][Oo][Gg][liOo][Nn] with each
of the attribute values or the innerHTML of a visible node [50].
The likely candidates are ranked by the frequency of the matched
regular expressions and the attribute the keywords are found in
(e.g., the innerText of an element would be a better indicator of the
Timeout/error
125,377 (12%)
No response
67,789 (7%)
Scan 
Completed
806,834
(81%)
Submission 
successful 
191913
(24%)
Validation 
error/broken
22,442 (3%)
Not find 
login
592,479
(73%)
Figure 2: Overview of scan results
Figure 3: Percent of sites where login is found by popularity
rank. Each bucket is for 1000 sites for which the scan completed.
purpose of the login). Invisible elements are not considered because
a human user would not interact with them, and single-sign-on
buttons are ruled out completely. If none of the attempts lead to a
login form, SwapScan records that no login was found for this site
and concludes this test.
Testing Submission. If a login form is found, it is autofilled with
the dummy username and password and submitted. Outgoing traffic
is observer to look for the dummy username and password. Swap-
Scan also saves all outgoing traffic from the browser for analysis
explained in Section 6.2.
6.2 Scanning
In February 2017, we used SwapScan to scan Alexa’s top million
websites. This took approximately 16 hours using 200 Amazon
AWS c4.2large instances, each running 10 parallel scans, averaging
around 2 minutes per website.
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the results of the scan. The key finding,
discussed in Section 6.3, is that the password swapping approach
works on the vast majority of websites (98% in our study). Here, we
explain why some websites were not tested and the success rate for
finding login forms among those that were tested.
Nonresponsive Websites. Out of the 1 million sites attempted,
932,211 (93%) responded with 2xx or 3xx response codes. This result
is consistent with OpenWPM’s scan result in January 2016, which
found that 917,261 (92%) of the websites successfully loaded [14]
The scanner imposes a four-minute timeout for the total time
to scan each website. Time outs and errors are affected by net-
work speed and slow server response times (this primarily impacts
websites hosted in other countries). SwapScan considers the scan
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incomplete if it has not completed the full scan itinerary at a max-
imum depth before the allotted four minutes expire. Errors and
timeouts excluded 123,481 (12%) of the websites out from the scan.
No Discovered Login Forms. Among the remaining 806,834 sites,
SwapScan found 214,355 (27%) websites with native login forms.
Some sites do not provide any native login form, either because
they do not have user accounts or only support single-sign-on au-
thentication, which we do not include since there is no password
to manage. There are several possible reasons, however, why Swap-
Scan could fail to find a login form on a site that has one. The
scanning heuristics assume login forms always include an element
with type=password, but this does not hold for all login forms.
For example, some sites use a two-step login process where the
username is collected by the first form, and the password input is
only revealed after the visitor submits a username. Our heuristics
only consider English-language keywords, so may miss login forms
labeled with other languages. Finally, we assume that an important
login form would be accessible within a few clicks from the front
page of a website.
Figure 3 shows the fraction of websites for which a login was
found as the popularity of the site decreases. The success rate
reflects the likelihood that more popular sites are more likely to
provide user accounts, less likely to rely fully on single-sign-on
authentication, and perhaps more likely to be designed in a way
that makes the login form easier for an automated scanner to find.
We are not able to distinguish among these (and other) possible
reasons in our study, however.
Out of the 214,355 sites found with native logins, 22,442 (10%)
sites’ login did not respond with an outbound request upon sub-
mission. This may be due to broken logins or client-side validation
errors. The remaining 191,913 sites (90%) were tested for compati-
bility with Horcrux, and these are the sites analyzed in Section 6.3.
Comparison with Previous Results. The largest previous scan
of website login forms was Acker et al.’s 2017 study of the top
100,000 websites [2]. They reported finding 48,547 logins on those
sites, where our scan only found 25,449. There are several reasons
for the difference.We used heuristics to eliminate registration forms,
ruling out forms with any indications of a registration-related input.
Their scan counted any form with a type=password field as a login
form, so counted some forms that were not considered login forms
by our scan. Acker et al. counted 2,760 as not reachable within the
51% failed websites, while we considered 16,584 websites as not
having completed the scan because they were either broken or did
not respond fast enough to make our 4 minute threshold. Our scan
required more interactions with the websites because we needed
to observe the actual submission traffic, not just find the form, so
more websites timed out. Further, we relied on the fact that the
website was functioning quickly enough and that the login was
reachable from the front page, whereas Acker et al.’s use of crawlers
and search engines may have revealed login forms that were not
directly accessible from the front page, which boosted their rate of
finding logins.5
5We considered using search queries for our scan also, but decided against this because
of the unavailability of search engine APIs that allow enough queries for the larger
scale of our scan.
6.3 Compatibility Results
A site is counted as compatible if both the username and password
dummy credentials are recognized in any request. SwapScan records
all network traffic during a 3-second duration following a form
submission. Of the websites where forms were successfully found
and submitted, 187,736 (98%) appeared to be compatible. On these
sites, both the dummy username and password were observed in the
intercepted traffic so the credential substitution approach should
work. While we define compatibility broadly, for security reasons
our Horcrux password manager only reveals real credentials in
HTTPS POST requests to the correct target domain (Section 4.1).
In cases where multiple requests are sent following a login form
submission, we consider the request that contained the most infor-
mation (e.g., we would favor a request containing both username
and password over a request only containing the username). When
we only see one of the username or the password in a request, we
would check other requests from that website to see if the missing
credential is in a different request.
We found some websites that were doing client-side encryption
on credentials before sending them out to the server. We found
817 (<1%) of websites sending their requests out with a plaintext
username and MD5-hashed password. These websites are counted
as compatibale because Horcrux can look for the MD5-hashed
dummy password in outgoing traffic and replace it with the MD5-
hash of the real password.
Reasons for Incompatibility.Of the tested sites, 4177 (2%) appear
to be incompatible with credential substitution. For 3266 (78%) of
these, the dummy username was observed in intercepted traffic but
not the dummy password. We manually examined a sample of ten
of these sites, and found that nine of them were sending the dummy
password transformed by some function other than MD5 hash. The
remaining sampled site had an empty password field, which means
that the site was either broken or did not send the password because
client-side validation failed. The (probably misguided) inclination
for sites to do client-side hashing of passwords explains why not
observing the dummy password is the most common reason for
incompatibility.
We also manually examined a sample of ten sites selected from
the 881 incompatible sites where the password was observed but not
the username. Three of these sent requests with empty username
fields, one with a transformed username (but not a cryptographic
hash). For the six remaining sites, we could not determine the
reason why the dummy username had not appeared in the traffic.
One threat to validity is searching for dummy credentials that
are not unique and long. We choose credentials with a goal of
passing any client-side validation checks, so they could not be long
random strings. Still, there is little risk of encountering the same
string meant for another context, as our checking scope is limited
to requests made in response to our form submissions.
SwapScan found that the password swapping would work on the
preponderance (98%) of websites in the top million, and could be
successfully deployed in a modern browser to work on today’s web.
If any popular sites are incompatible (i.e. www.sohu.com) , it may be
necessary to include special rules for matching custom client-side
password transformations. At worst, users can fall back to manual
logins for incompatible sites.
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6.4 Other Results from Scanning Experiment
Although the goal of our study was to learn about the compatibility
of password swapping across the web, as a byproduct of our scan
we learned some other interesting things about web logins. Figure 4
summarizes these results.
Protocol. From an analysis of the URL destination of these login
requests, we found that 102,948 (51%) of logins do not submit a
request through HTTPS protocol, which exposes the username and
password to man-in-the-middle attacks.
AJAX. When a login form uses AJAX to grab the username and
password from the form, a header named "X-Requested-With" with
a value "XMLHTTPRequest" could be seen in the request. SwapScan
used this property to identify 15,707 (8%) websites using AJAX
requests, which indicates that JavaScript is used to submit the form
data. This is a significant portion of websites that are compatible
with Horcrux, but potentially incompatible with other secure login
mechanisms, such as Secure Filling [45]. Submitting a form through
JavaScript also means that the JavaScript may or may not consider
the form action; even if a password manager ensure that the action
is secure, it may not be actually used.
Form action. Traditional password managers check the form ac-
tion to ensure that the credentials are being submitted to the correct
protocol and domain. Out of the login forms that were scanned,
18,628 (10%) percent of the forms did not have an action listed. For
these sites, a non-Horcrux password manager would not be able
to check the action to ensure that the credentials are headed to
the correct domain. Since static analysis of JavaScript is difficult,
the only way to ensure the correct destination for credentials is to
dynamically check them, which Horcrux does naturally.
Category Percentage
HTTPS Protocol 49%
HTTP Protocol 51%
GET Request 2%
POST Request 98%
Other Methods <1%
AJAX Login 9%
Non-AJAX Login 91%
Action Present 90%
Action Not Present 10%
Figure 4: Types of logins found by the scan (percentages are
out of the number of completed form submissions).
7 DISCUSSION
Our goal in building the Horcrux prototype and conducting our
experiments was to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of
a more secure password manager. Here, we discuss a few issues
that we did not address in our prototype implementation but that
would be important to handle before deployment.
Browser Integration. Our prototype was implemented as a Fire-
fox add-on, but Mozilla is planning on deprecate the Firefox add-on
SDK and migrate to WebExtension [36] with the goal of supporting
cross-browser compatibility. We built our add-on using the soon-
to-be legacy SDK because WebExtension does not currently have
support for themajority of low-level APIs [38], some ofwhichwe de-
pend on to manipulate HTTPS traffic. WebExtension’s webRequest
API only allows less powerful capabilities such as canceling and
redirecting a request, modifying request and response headers,
and supplying authentication credentials in-flight [37]. Our add-
on needed the capacity to change POST request content. Google
Chrome’s webRequest API has similar limitations [33]. We recog-
nize that this design choice is motivated by security—the browser
vendors do not want to give third-party, untrusted browser add-ons
too much power in case permissions are not reviewed carefully
by the user or the developer [7]. In this regard, our design is best-
suited for incorporating directly into the browser by changing how
the default password manager autofills and stores passwords. In-
tegrating Horcrux into a browser would also eliminate possible
traffic visibility among multiple add-ons, which was discussed in
Section 4.1. Providing support for mobile devices would also be
important, but we have not yet considered that.
Supporting Multiple Accounts per Domain. The current Hor-
crux design does not support multiple usernames for one domain.
The keystore scheme can be easily modified to support multiple
usernames by including the username when calculating the table
keys and picking a larger hash table size. In this design, however,
Horcrux needs to know the full username prior to making the re-
quest to the keystores. The user would either need to enter the
username manually, or Horcrux would need to maintain a local
copy of domain and usernames, which defeats the goal of domain
and username privacy. An alternative, would be to assume for most
domains the user only has one username, but to store something
special in the value entry for multi-user domains so the first re-
quest would return a list of the usernames instead of the password.
Then, those names could be presented to the user to select from in
the manager’s interface. We believe multiple usernames could be
handled without any security compromises.
Setting up New Devices. As discussed in Section 3.3, there are
two ways to set up new devices to work with Horcrux securely
transfer config.json, the file containing encrypted keystore cre-
dentials, to the new device or re-enter the database access stores
into Horcrux. Neither options provide the convenience supported
by commercial password managers because the user is not trust-
ing a password manager to store his access keys. Upon entering
their master password on the new device, the core component will
use PBKDF2 to derive the key needed to successfully decrypt the
keystore credentials.
8 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss related work on secret sharing and data
protection and authentication.
Secret Sharing and Data Protection. Although splitting secrets
using XOR was known to ancient cryptographers, the first efficient
threshold secret-sharing schemes were discovered separately by
Shamir [43] and Blakeley [9] in the late 1970s. Our implementation
uses Shamir’s scheme.
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Several prior works have used secret-sharing to protect data.
Password-protected secret sharing (PPSS) [6] presents a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) model for distributing the trust of sensitive
data to t + 1 hosts, with the ability to protect user data from being
reconstructed by at most t compromised hosts. PPSS mentions
the utility of distributing user credentials in a password manager
setting, though it does not investigate the application of its protocol
in relation to common password manager database schemes, such
as those found in Gasti et al. [19].
Password Manager Storage. Gasti notes the storage weaknesses
of numerous password managers such as Chrome’s unencrypted
local SQLite database, 1Password’s credential storage with AES-
128 and CBC mode encryption, and KeePass’ header-hashing data
integrity checks [19]. The paper finds that many popular password
managers are poorly suited against IND-CDBA (eavesdropping) or
MAL- CDBA (data manipulation) schemes. Gasti categorizes the
managers as (1) “those that can be assumed safe on an insecure
storage medium” (2) “those that can be used if the underlying
storage mechanism provides integrity and data authenticity” and
(3) “those that can be used securely only if the underlying storage
provides integrity, authenticity and secrecy” . The paper concludes
that many password managers used database storage schemes that
were vulnerable to read-only and read-write attacks.
Protecting Passwords from Scripts. Stock and Johns considered
the problem of injected scripts stealing autofilled credentials from
password forms, and proposed a client-side defense similar to the
password swapping method used by Horcrux [46]. They imple-
mented a prototype Firefox extension to perform password swap-
ping, similar to what is done by our implementation, and conducted
an evaluation of the top 4000 websites to determine how many in-
cluded scripts that accessed password data, and manually inspected
some of those scripts to understand whether password swapping
was likely to work on those sites. Since their study required manual
analysis, it could not scale to a large number of websites. Their im-
plementation used local storage of passwords, and did not consider
ways to reduce the size of the trusted client-side component.
9 CONCLUSION
Passwords remain essential for web security, and improving the
security of password management is an important goal for our
community. We have demonstrated that it is possible for a password
manager to minimize exposure of passwords to a few hundred lines
of simple code, while using secret-sharing to mitigate the threat of
server compromises.
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